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Abstract:   
 
Research conducted on the decision points between arrest and sentencing is scarce.  The 
current study attempts to fill this gap by focusing on plea negotiations, examining the effects 
of individual characteristics on plea bargaining decisions by using two dependent variables – 
a two-category dependent variable analyzing negotiated pleas vs. non-negotiated pleas and a 
three-category dependent variable analyzing negotiated pleas, non-negotiated pleas, and 
bench/jury trial convictions.  The results from the multinomial logistic regression indicate 
that individual characteristics are predictors of negotiated guilty pleas compared to a trial 
conviction.  Black offenders were more likely than white offenders to have their case go to 
trial rather than straight pleading or negotiating a guilty plea. 
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DISPARITIES IN CHARGE BARGAINING:  TESTING AN INTEGRATED THEORY 
Discretionary power . . . places the prosecutor in a position of influence perhaps unmatched in the 
entire system of criminal justice. (Gottfredson & Gottfredson, 1988, p. 113).  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Scholars agree that the American prosecutor possesses a great amount of discretion (see Albonetti, 1987; Kersetter, 
1990; Thomas & Fitch, 1976).  Scholars also agree that such discretion has the potential to result in discrimination in 
the form of unwarranted disparity (Walker, Spohn, & DeLone, 2000).  American prosecutors use their discretion to 
make initial charging decisions, to seek the death penalty, and to negotiate plea agreements.   
 
One of the most profound and frequently studied issues in the American criminal justice system is racial 
discrimination.  Research indicated that Black offenders were disproportionately represented in prison populations 
(see Blumstein, Cohen, Martin, & Tonry, 1983; Walker, et al., 2000).  Although Black citizens represent 13% of the 
U.S. population, they represent 45% of the incarcerated population in state and federal prisons (Harrison & Beck, 
2003).  Wilmot and Spohn (2004) suggested that “charging and plea bargaining decisions – which determine the 
charge of conviction – assume a pivotal role in the process” (p. 326).   
 
Research conducted on the decision points between arrest and sentencing is scarce.  As Albonetti (1990) noted, “by 
focusing largely on outcome decisions (bail and sentencing), research has failed to examine race differences in 
actual processing, namely, whether the case went to trial or was pled guilty” (p. 320).  There is a need for research 
to examine earlier decision points such as initial charging and plea negotiations.  Few studies have examined 
unwarranted disparity in plea bargaining decisions, and most of the existing studies on plea bargaining are 
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qualitative in nature, explaining how plea negotiations are processed rather than the determinants of these decisions.  
The current research provides a quantitative approach to the examination of the effect of individual characteristics 
on the prosecutor’s plea bargaining decisions in a sentencing guideline state. 
 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND HYDRAULIC DISPLACEMENT OF DISCRETION 
 
Court research on unwarranted disparities typically focus on charging or sentencing decisions (see Johnson, 2003; 
Spohn & Beichner, 2000; Spohn & Cederblom, 1991; Spohn & Holleran, 2000; Steffensmeier & Demuth, 2000).  It 
has been well-documented that sentencing reforms have created a system that is more determinate and more punitive 
(Spohn, 2002; Spohn, 2000; Tonry, 1996).  Prior to the 21st century, the United States Supreme Court has left 
sentencing relatively untouched, maintaining the sentencing authority with the judge – that is, until now.  
  
The objective behind these sentencing reforms has been to limit judicial discretion and provide uniformity in 
sentencing decisions to avoid potential unwarranted disparate treatment.  More recently, though, this objective has 
been challenged by the defendant’s right to jury trial under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
in landmark decisions such as Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000), Blakely v. Washington (2004), and United States v. 
Booker (2005).   
 
One of the major goals of the sentencing reforms was to limit discretion.  By requiring judges to follow structured 
sentencing procedures, reformers intended to restrict the discretion of judicial decision-making power (Spohn, 
2000).  By restraining judicial discretionary decision-making, reformers hoped to limit unwarranted disparity – 
especially with regards to individual offender characteristics.  The creation of sentencing guidelines introduced a 
more uniform and, thereby, less individualized system of justice to combat potential problems of unwarranted 
disparity.  “Sentencing guidelines . . . reflect a fundamental dilemma of formal social control – the balance between 
uniformity . . . and individualization” (Ulmer & Kramer, 1996, p. 383). 
 
 The United States Supreme Court has virtually avoided questions about sentencing out 
of a reliance on the power of legislators and trial judges to change sentencing policy (Bibas, 
2001).  The Court addressed several constitutional issues regarding important rights in the trial 
court process.  The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, historically, had the most impact on 
judicial sentencing decisions.  The Sixth Amendment states: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. (U.S. Constitution, Amendment VI). 
 
Until recently, the Supreme Court did not address the constitutionality of sentencing reforms which were imposed to 
limit judicial discretion.  The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of sentencing guidelines in 
Mistretta v. U.S. (1989).  This case, however, did not address individual liberties; it addressed the authority of the 
different branches to delegate certain powers.  The Court in Mistretta decided that Congress’ delegation of their law-
making power to an independent agency did not violate the separation of powers clause of the U.S. Constitution.  On 
its face, therefore, the Supreme Court in Mistretta decided that reliance on sentencing guidelines is an acceptable 
practice. 
 
Approximately ten years later, though, sentencing decisions under the guise of sentencing reforms were under attack 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000).  In this case, the defendant’s sentence was 
enhanced beyond the original charge to which he pled guilty.  Although the State argued that the facts supporting the 
enhancement penalty were merely “sentencing factors,” the Court in Apprendi ruled that these facts were more akin 
to “element factors” – that is, factors attributed to the elements of the underlying crime – to which the Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial attached.  
  
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court addressed a mandatory penalty system, raising the declared sentence above the 
statutory maximum.  Four years after Apprendi, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of another 
sentencing reform practice – sentencing guidelines.  The Supreme Court in Blakely used the ruling in Apprendi to 
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find that judicial upward departures from the prescribed guideline range maximum violated the defendant’s right to 
a jury trial.  The Court ruled that due to the presumptive nature of the guidelines, the “maximum” that triggered  
Sixth Amendment rights to jury trial was the maximum allowed by the statutory guidelines.  In other words, the 
maximum of the range of sentence, given the defendant’s prior criminal history and the current offense severity, was 
the ceiling beyond which a judge could not sentence above without a determination by the jury.2 
 
The “elements rule” noted in Apprendi – and later adopted by Blakely – signified more limits placed on judicial 
discretion (Bibas, 2001).  Some scholars suggested that this discretion will be displaced to other courtroom actors 
(Bensten, 2004; Bibas, 2001; Olson, 2002; Prieseter, 2004).  Bibas (2001) noted that the potential for displaced 
discretion lied within the plea bargaining power of the prosecutor.  Although the “elements rule” was intended to 
give notice to defendants about the facts that were against them, Bibas (2001) argued that prosecutors could 
circumvent this rule through plea negotiations.         
 
Given the frequency of guilty pleas (see Bureau of Justice Statistics, June 2003) and the weighted evidence against 
the defendant with the advent of the “elements rule,” it was no surprise that at least a few commentators were 
concerned with the displacement of discretion to prosecutors – a virtually unrestrained courtroom actor.  Although 
the Supreme Court limited the discretion of the judge, it gave more authority to the prosecutor either through 
charging and/or plea bargaining practices. 
 
EFFECT OF OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS ON COURT PROCESSING 
 
Research on prosecutor’s plea bargaining decisions has not experienced the same vigor and attention as judicial 
sentencing decisions.  “The plea bargaining discretion of the prosecutor looms so large that this position is 
increasingly recognized as the most powerful in the criminal justice system” (Bishop & Frazier, 1984, p. 387).  
Decisions by prosecutors can impact later decisions (e.g., bail and sentencing) by other members of the court (see 
Johnson, 2003; Kellough & Wortley, 2002; Wilmot & Spohn, 2004).  Wooldredge and Thistlethwaite (2004) found 
that earlier decisions by the prosecutor resulted in more favorable dispositions at the charging stage yet less 
favorable at the conviction and/or sentencing stage.  Therefore, it is important to address potential unwarranted 
disparities in these earlier decisions – that is, plea negotiations. 
 
Research on plea negotiations has centered around two important decisions:  the decision to plead guilty and the 
decision to reduce charges and/or counts.  Most research has indicated that those defendants who took their cases to 
trial – that is, they did not plead guilty – received harsher sentences (see Brereton & Casper, 1981-1982; Britt, 
2000).  The most important influences on the likelihood of pleading guilty have been the severity of the current 
offense and the length and severity of the prior record (Meyer & Gray, 1997).  Studies also found, however, that 
Black defendants and male defendants were the least likely to plead guilty (Albonetti, 1990; Kellough & Wortley, 
2002; LaFree, 1985).  A higher proportion of Black defendants and Hispanic defendants go to trial than the 
proportion of white defendants even though the majority of the cases conclude with a negotiated guilty plea 
(Johnson, 2003).  Albonetti (1990) suggested that Black defendants, who were more likely to distrust the system, 
would have expressed this distrust by not pleading guilty and calling for a jury trial.  
  
Race and ethnicity is not the only offender characteristic that affects guilty plea decisions.  A few studies have 
acknowledged a relationship between sex of the offender and the likelihood of pleading guilty (Figuiera-
McDonough, 1985; Johnson, 2003).  Age of the offender has produced mixed results (Kellough & Wortley, 2002; 
LaFree, 1985).  This review has made it clear, therefore, that some research imputed a significant relationship 
between offender characteristics and the decision to plead guilty 
. 
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 In the most recent case to date, the United States Supreme Court similarly ruled in U.S. v. Booker (2005) for the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  The Court ruled that the remedy for such violation was to make the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines merely voluntary.  Since the current research is focused on a state guideline system, the focus 
is placed on Blakely v. Washington (2004). 
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Inexorably linked to defendants’ decisions to plead guilty are the decisions to reduce the charges in order to secure  
those guilty pleas.  With the advent of formalized sentencing procedures came greater discretion displaced to the 
prosecutor.  Although there was an increase in the amount of charge reductions given, Wooldredge and Griffen 
(2005) found that not one particular racial and/or gender group benefited from the greater discretionary power given 
to prosecutors.   
 
The decisions to reduce charges were heavily influenced by seriousness of the current offense and prior record (see 
McDonald, 1985; Meyer & Gray, 1997).  Although the seriousness of the current offense and prior record were the 
most important influences in determining charge reductions, a substantial amount of research found that individual 
characteristics also influenced charge reductions (see Albonetti, 1992; Bernstein, Kick, Leung, & Schulz, 1977; 
Farnworth & Teske, 1995; Figueira-McDonough, 1985; LaFree, 1980; McDonald, 1985; Miethe & Moore, 1986; 
Voit, 1987).   
 
The research on the effect of individual characteristics on the charge reduction decision has been mixed.  Bernstein 
and her associates (1977) found that White defendants were more likely to receive favorable charge reductions 
compared to Black defendants.  Albonetti (1992) found that younger defendants and male defendants were less 
likely to receive reduced charges than older defendants and female defendants, respectively.  Farnworth and Teske 
(1995) suggested found that young, Black male defendants were less likely than other defendants to have their initial 
charges reduced (Farnworth & Teske, 1995).  With these mixed results, it is important to clearly identify any 
potential unwarranted disparities in plea bargaining decisions based on legally-irrelevant offender characteristics. 
 
THE CURRENT STUDY 
 
Much of the research on the effect of individual characteristics on decisions in the courtroom has focused on 
sentencing decisions.  Few researchers have examined the effect of these characteristics on prosecutorial decisions – 
especially, plea bargaining decisions.  No research has examined potential disparities in plea bargaining decisions in 
a sentencing guideline state.    
  
The sentencing literature has noted that young, Black (and Hispanic) male offenders have received the harshest 
penalties after controlling for legally relevant factors (see, Spohn & Holleran, 2000; Steffensmeier, et al., 1998).  
The few research studies examining the effect of individual characteristics on plea bargaining have seemed to 
suggest a similar relationship (see Ball, 2005).  Despite the neglect of research on plea bargaining, it is important to 
address the potential relationship of individual characteristics to the plea bargaining decision.   
 
DATA3 
 
The current study is an analysis of secondary data collected by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, 
reflecting all felonies and misdemeanors that were sentenced during 1998 in the State of Pennsylvania.  The current 
study addresses and merges two datasets:  official offense data and official records data.  The offense dataset 
includes information on the type and severity of the offense, official prior record score information, and information 
on the disposition and sentence for each offense.  The records dataset includes demographic information and prior 
arrest and conviction information on each offender in a given judicial proceeding.   
 
It is important to note that the two datasets include dissimilar units of analysis.  The unit of analysis for the offense 
dataset is the offense.  The unit of analysis for the records dataset is the judicial proceeding.  Therefore, it is likely 
that one individual may have multiple offenses in a given judicial proceeding.  In order to address the relationship 
between particular demographic variables – namely, race/ethnicity, sex, and age of the offender – and plea 
bargaining decisions, it is necessary to merge these two datasets.  In order to accomplish this task, though, the  
 
 
                                                 
3
 Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing.  PENNSYLVANIA SETNENCING DATA, 1998 [Computer file].  
ICPSR version.  State College, PA:  Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing [producer], 2000.  Ann Arbor, MI:  
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2002. 
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offenses are aggregated to the individual judicial proceeding, calculating average scores across offenses in a 
particular judicial proceeding for a given variable.  In order to address meaningful relationships and provide realistic 
boundaries to this research, the analyses are limited to felony judicial proceedings in one metropolitan county in 
Pennsylvania (N = 3,421).  
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This study attempts to establish potential relationships between demographic characteristics of the individual 
offender and the plea bargaining decision in a sentencing guideline state.  As stated earlier, sentencing guidelines 
were intended to restrict judicial discretion and, thereby, intended to restrict judicial sentencing disparity.  However, 
the guidelines were not intended to limit prosecutorial discretion.  With the latest decision in Blakely, discretion and 
potentially unwarranted disparity is a vitally important issue in the literature on court processing decisions.  From 
previous research (see Ball, 2005), it is important to disentangle negotiated guilty pleas from straight guilty pleas.  
The current study, therefore, proposes the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Race/ethnicity, sex, and age of the offender will be significantly related to the likelihood 
of receiving a negotiated guilty plea (compared to non-negotiated guilty plea). 
 
H1a  Black and Hispanic offenders will be less likely than White offenders 
to receive a negotiated guilty plea. 
H1b Male offenders will be less likely than female offenders to receive a 
negotiated guilty plea. 
H1c  Younger offenders will be less likely than older offenders to receive a 
negotiated guilty plea. 
 
It is also important to note the potential impact of individual characteristics on the decision to take one’s case to 
trial.  It has been argued that disparate treatment may not appear in the plea negotiation process but in the decision to 
take one’s case to trial (Johnson, 2003).  This study proposes the following hypotheses: 
 
H2: Race/ethnicity, sex, and age of the offender will be significantly related to the likelihood 
of going to trial rather than pleading guilty. 
 
H2a  Black and Hispanic offenders will be more likely than White offenders 
to have their case go to trial rather than pleading guilty – negotiated or 
not. 
H2b Male offenders will be more likely than female offenders to have their 
case go to trial rather than pleading guilty – negotiated or not. 
H2c  Younger offenders will be more likely than older offenders to have 
their case go to trial rather than pleading guilty – negotiated or not. 
 
 
VARIABLES 
 
The dependent variable utilized for this study is case disposition.  Case disposition is defined in two different ways 
to reflect the two tensions identified above.  The first measure of the dependent variable addresses the dichotomy 
between negotiated guilty plea and straight guilty plea – or, non-negotiated guilty plea.  The second measure 
addresses the tension between negotiated guilty plea, straight plea and conviction by trial.  This second measure is 
intended to examine the potential differences in the effects of individual characteristics on plea bargaining and/or the 
decision to take a case to trial.  The variables and their codes and frequencies are presented in Table 1 and Table 2.  
  
[Insert Table1 and Table 2 here] 
 
To obtain a dichotomous measure of negotiated guilty pleas, the original disposition variable was recoded where 
only guilty pleas were considered.  The original data indicated whether the guilty plea was negotiated or not.  To 
obtain a similar measure including trial convictions, the original disposition variable was recoded where guilty pleas 
(negotiated or not) and conviction by trial (bench or jury) were considered.   
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Since it was necessary to aggregate the data from offenses to individual judicial proceedings, the scores on particular 
variables were averaged across different offenses.  There were a handful of judicial proceedings with multiple 
offenses where a mixture of offenses was negotiated guilty pleas, non-negotiated guilty pleas and/or trial 
convictions.  Due to the aggregation process, these cases included non-whole integer values and, thus, could not be 
properly and adequately analyzed and interpreted.  These cases are eliminated from the analyses.4 
 
The project utilizes several independent variables to predict plea bargaining decisions.  There are two general 
categories of independent variables outlined in this research:  individual characteristics and case characteristics.5  
Individual characteristics include race/ethnicity, sex, age, and number of prior convictions.  Race/ethnicity is defined 
as a dummy variable with “White” characterized as the reference category.  Case characteristics include type of 
most serious current charge filed, most serious class of charge filed, whether the offense was completed or not, and 
number of charges filed.   
 
One of the independent variables (i.e., class of charge) was impacted by the aggregation process.  Since multiple 
offenses for a given judicial proceeding could produce multiple classes, a value of a particular class dummy variable 
could, again, be a non-whole integer value.  Therefore, it was required to calculate the most serious class of offense 
– given multiple offenses in a single judicial proceeding – and create dummy variables for each class where 
unclassified felonies were characterized as the reference category.   
Two variables – number of charges filed and prior convictions – indicate a skewed distribution, suggesting that a 
logged method maybe necessary.  However, after careful examination of the regression analyses, it is determined 
that a logged value is no stronger of a prediction than the original continuous value.  Therefore, the original 
measurement is used. 
 
To measure the effect of individual demographic characteristics on plea bargaining decisions, the current study 
employs two logistic regression analyses.  Logistic regression is used for analyses examining dependent variables 
that are categorical (see Aldrich & Nelson, 1984; Menard, 2002).  The current project uses binary logistic regression 
for analyzing the effect of individual demographic characteristics on the likelihood of a negotiated guilty plea – a 
dichotomous dependent variable.  This study also employs a multinomial logistic regression for analyzing the effect 
of these individual characteristics on case disposition:  negotiated guilty plea, non-negotiated guilty plea and trial 
conviction.6   
 
RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
 
Table 1 presents the frequency distributions for the variables used for the binomial dependent variable – that is, 
negotiated guilty plea or not.  The results show that the majority of case dispositions resulting in a guilty plea were 
negotiated guilty pleas (N = 2,268; 83.6%).  The frequency distributions also indicate that the majority of the sample 
is Black (66.7%) and male (88.7%) with an average age of 28 years.  Over one-third (37.0%) of the judicial 
proceedings resulted in a low severity of offense – Felony 3.  
  
Table 2 presents frequency distributions for the variables used for the multinomial analyses – negotiated guilty plea, 
non-negotiated guilty plea, and trial conviction.  Again, the majority of dispositions for this sample resulted in a 
negotiated guilty plea (68.8%) with 13.4% of dispositions ending in a non-negotiated guilty plea and 17.8% 
resulting in a trial conviction.  Again, the majority of offenders in this sample were Black (68.2%) and male (89.6%) 
with an average age of 28 years.  The majority of cases (35.5%) under this multinomial analysis resulted in a class 
Felony 3 charge as the most serious class of charge. 
                                                 
4
 For the “negotiated plea/non-negotiated plea” model, a total of 18 cases are eliminated.  For the “negotiated 
plea/non-negotiated plea/trial conviction” model, a total of 29 cases are eliminated. 
5
 There are no strength of evidence variables included in the original study.  Past research that included strength of 
evidence as an important variable usually addressed initial screening and/or charging decisions.  The current 
research is centered on subsequent plea bargaining decisions.  It is presumed that the strength of evidence would 
have already been considered during the initial screening process. 
6
 It can be rationalized that the three categories of negotiated plea, non-negotiated plea, and jury/bench trial could be 
ordinal.  To determine if the dependent variable was ordered, an ordinal logistic regression was conducted.  This 
data, however, failed the parallel slopes assumption.  Thus, the three category dependent variable is not ordered but 
unordered.  Multinomial logistic regression is the appropriate analysis for this dependent variable.   
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Binomial Logistic Regression 
The results of the binomial logistic regression analysis are presented in Table 3.  This model is statistically 
significant (p<.05) and provides 11.8% proportional reduction in error (Nagelkerke R2 = 0.118).  The results reveal 
that none of the individual demographic characteristics have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of 
obtaining a negotiated guilty plea.  In fact, there were only three statistically significant independent variables: 
Felony 1 (-2.294), prior convictions (-0.376), and property offense (0.833). 
 
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
 
The unstandardized coefficients of dichotomous independent variables can be interpreted by using the formula (eb – 
1) * 100.  This formula provides the odds of being in a specific category relative to the probability of being in the 
omitted category.  Three of the legally relevant variables – most serious class of offense, type of offense, and prior 
convictions – do affect the plea negotiation decision.  Offenders who were charged with a Felony 1 – the most 
serious class – were significantly less likely to receive a negotiated guilty plea than those offenders who were 
charged with an unclassified felony (89.9 expected percentage change in the odds of negotiating a guilty plea 
relative to a non-negotiated guilty plea).  Offenders who have more prior convictions are less likely to receive a 
negotiated guilty plea compared to offenders with less prior convictions (68.6 expected percentage change in the 
odds of negotiating a guilty plea relative to a non-negotiated guilty plea).  Finally, offenders convicted of property 
offenses are more likely than other offenses to receive a negotiated plea (129 expected percentage change in the 
odds of negotiating a guilty plea relative to a non-negotiated guilty plea).  
 
One can also classify which of the statistically significant independent variables are more important than the others 
by calculating the standardized effect (b*σx).  The largest absolute value of the standardized effect is considered the 
most important factor relative to the other statistically significant variables.  The largest standardized effect reported 
in Table 3 is Felony 1 charge (0.757).  Property offense (0.410) and prior convictions (0.392) follow and are fairly 
close in ranking.  Therefore, the most important variables are legally relevant characteristics – the most serious class 
of offense, type of offense, and prior convictions. 
 
To understand the unstandardized effects in a meaningful way through comparisons of interesting cases, it is 
important to calculate predicted probabilities.  Predicted probabilities were calculated by setting continuous 
independent variables at their mean and placing dichotomous independent variables at points of interest.  Thus, 
predicted probabilities are calculated for offenders who committed a felony 1 offense, were 28.38 years of age, had 
0.42 prior convictions, and had 1.41 charges brought against them.  As can be seen in Table 4, there appears to be 
little difference in predicted probabilities across individual demographic characteristics 
. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Multinomial logistic regression was used to simultaneously analyze negotiated plea, non-negotiated plea, and 
bench/jury trial7.  The reference category in the multinomial logistic regression was bench/jury trial; thus the 
likelihood of receiving a negotiated guilty plea and the likelihood of receiving a non-negotiated guilty plea are 
compared to the likelihood of receiving a bench/jury trial.  The model was statistically significant with a pseudo R2 
of 0.176. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Some individual demographic characteristics are statistically significant in the likelihood of receiving a negotiated 
guilty plea compared to the likelihood of receiving a bench/jury trial and the likelihood of receiving a non-
negotiated guilty plea compared to the likelihood of receiving a bench/jury trial.  Male offenders (0.647) were more 
likely than female offenders to receive a negotiated guilty plea compared to a bench/jury trial conviction.  Black 
offenders (-0.425) were less likely than white offenders to receive a negotiated guilty plea compared to a bench/jury 
trial conviction.  These findings were similar comparing the non-negotiated guilty pleas to bench/jury trial 
convictions – male offenders (0.890) and Black offenders (-0.646). 
                                                 
7
 Due to the small number of jury trials (N=62), a four category dependent variable could not be used. 
This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form has been published in the Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice © 2007 
copyright Taylor & Francis; Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice is available online at:  
http://www.informaworld.com doi: 10.1300/J222v05n04_03 
E. Davis Frenzel, & J. Ball in JOURNAL OF ETHNICITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2007) 8 
 
 
Of particular interest, legally relevant factors – type of offense (property 1.029) and prior number of convictions (-
0.456) – are only significant when comparing the negotiated guilty plea decision to the bench/jury trial decision.  
Offenders convicted of property offenses were more likely than those convicted of other felonies to receive a 
negotiated guilty plea as opposed to receiving a bench/jury trial conviction.  As the number of prior convictions 
decreases the likelihood of negotiating a guilty plea increases compared to having a bench/jury trial. 
 
Standardized coefficients were calculated for statistically significant independent variables.  The most important 
independent variables in predicting a negotiated guilty plea compared to a bench/jury trial conviction are the legally 
relevant variables of prior convictions (0.543) and property offense (0.473), followed by sex of the offender (.201) 
and race (Black) of the offender (0.200). 
 
Predicted probabilities are calculated for the multinomial logistic regression similarly to the analyses in the binomial 
logistic regression.  Because the multinomial logistic regression produced different samples due to the different 
selection criteria for guilty pleas and trial convictions, means of particular variables varied slightly.  Predicted 
probabilities were calculated for offenders who committed a felony 1 offense, were 28.30 years of age, had 0.51 
prior convictions, and had 1.42 charges brought against them.  The results are summarized in Table 6.  Female 
offenders, regardless of race, are more likely to go to trial rather than plead guilty – negotiated or not (approximately 
10 percentage points less likely for each category).  Black and Hispanic offenders are more likely to go to trial rather 
than plead guilty – negotiated or not. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
Prosecutors have a substantial amount of discretionary power which, left unchecked, can result in unwarranted 
disparity (Walker, et al., 2000).  Since prosecutors have nearly unfettered discretion in making decisions about plea 
negotiations, there is the possibility that legally irrelevant individual demographic characteristics will influence 
decisions to offer plea negotiations. 
 
The purpose of this research was to disentangle the negotiated guilty plea from a straight guilty plea (see Ball, 
2005).  The first hypothesis was that race/ethnicity, sex, and age of the offender will be significantly related to the 
likelihood of receiving a negotiated guilty plea.  The current study did not find support for this hypothesis; none of 
the individual demographic characteristics were statistically significant.  In fact, the results revealed that legally 
relevant variables (class of offense, type of offense, and number of prior convictions) were the only predictors of 
negotiated guilty plea decision. 
 
It was also important to consider predictors of the negotiated guilty plea, non-negotiated guilty plea, and the 
bench/jury trial conviction decision and determine whether individual demographics influence these decisions.  The 
second hypothesis was that race/ethnicity, sex, and age of the offender will be significantly related to the likelihood 
of going to trial rather than negotiating a plea or straight pleading.  Using multinomial logistic regression, it was 
discovered that demographic characteristics were predictors of the decision to negotiate a guilty plea compared to 
the bench/jury trial conviction decision.  The second hypothesis was partially supported.  The results show that 
Black offenders were more likely than white offenders to have their case go to trial rather than straight pleading or 
negotiating a guilty plea.  However, the second part of the second hypothesis – that is, male offenders were more 
likely than female offenders to have their case go to trial than to plead guilty or receive a plea negotiation – was not 
supported.  In fact, the opposite was found.  Male offenders were less likely than female offenders to have their case 
go to trial. 
 
There are several possible alternative explanations for the results from these analyses.  “Symbolic 
bargaining” may explain why individual characteristics did not significantly influence negotiated 
guilty pleas.   
While some changes (a reduction of rape to battery or armed robbery to robbery) can be 
significant and have important sentencing implications, others may be symbolic or largely so (a 
reduction of burglary to larceny in a building or dropping three counts of theft in a four-count 
indictment) (Nardulli, Eisenstein, ad Flemming, 1988, p. 214). 
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Having knowledge about whether a specific guilty plea is a result of a true bargain or a symbolic bargain could 
greatly improve the analyses about the potential relationship between offender characteristics and plea bargaining 
practices.  Even though the current analyses did not produce evidence to suggest disparate treatment in prosecutors’ 
plea bargaining decisions, these disparities may be masked by symbolic bargaining. 
 
The results from multinomial logistic regression analyses may indicate that racial/ethnic minorities may feel a sense 
of apprehension about the system and want to be heard in a trial proceeding.  Albonetti (1990) suggested that black 
defendants, who were more likely to distrust the system, may express this distrust by not pleading guilty and calling 
for a jury trial.  Therefore, the disparity displayed in cases going to trial may not be a product of a trial penalty but 
may be a product of distrust from particular defendants.  Future research should attempt to examine whether this 
disparity is explained by differential treatment or by the offender’s distrust of the system. 
There are a few limitations to this current research.  First, the data used for this project required one to merge two 
separate datasets with different units of analysis.  Therefore, some data was lost due to averages being created from 
multiple cases for a single offender.  This project also eliminated some cases because the dependent variable 
produced non-whole integers; however, the strictest of minority of cases were eliminated.  
  
There were no strength of evidence variables included in the original dataset.  The literature highlights the 
importance of including strength of evidence variables to determine the value of the case prior to the examination of 
the effect of individual characteristics on the likelihood of a negotiated guilty plea.  If the prosecutor has strong 
evidence to suggest factual guilt, the defendant is less likely to receive a plea negotiation.  On the other hand, if the 
prosecutor has weak evidence, the defendant is likely to take their case to trial.  Future research should include 
qualitative data on the reasons for taking a case to trial or not 
. 
Although this study examined important potential effects of individual demographic characteristics on plea 
negotiation decisions – an understudied phenomenon – there remains improvements for future research.  First, future 
research could examine how plea negotiation decisions differentiate within the context of severity of charge.  More 
specifically, research on plea bargaining can utilize the liberation hypothesis to examine the context within which 
individual characteristics can impact plea bargaining decisions.  Second, research on legally irrelevant variables on 
plea bargaining decisions can consult interaction terms between race/ethnicity, sex, and age.  Interaction terms can 
provide a context within which disparate treatment can thrive; however, the sample size must be large enough to 
utilize interaction terms.  Finally, future research should examine the cumulative effects of individual characteristics 
in case processing decisions from arrest to charging to subsequent plea negotiations to sentencing (see Blumstein et 
al., 1989).   
 
With the advent of sentencing reforms to limit the discretion of judicial decision making and reduce unwarranted 
disparity, some scholars have suggested that judicial discretion has simply been displaced to prosecutors who are 
virtually unrestricted.  With the recent decisions in Apprendi and Blakely, though, this discretion displacement is, 
potentially, even more expansive.  Therefore, prosecutorial discretion is a phenomenon that is understudied yet 
vastly used in the American courtrooms today.  Plea bargaining is, arguably, the decision that is least restricted for 
prosecutors.  The vast majority of cases are decided by guilty pleas and plea negotiations.  Therefore, more research 
on plea bargaining in sentencing guidelines is imperative – especially after Blakely. 
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Table 1  Codes and Frequencies of Dependent and Independent Variables:  Binary Dependent Variable 
Variable  code N % 
 
mean 
Dependent Variable     
 Negotiated Guilty Plea 1=yes 2,268 83.6%  
   0=no 447 16.4  
      
Independent Variables+     
    Offender characteristics 
 
    
 Race/ethnicity     
  Black  1,745 66.7  
  Hispanic  444 17.0  
  White  401 15.3  
       
 Sex 1=male 2,379 88.7  
   0=female 302 11.3  
       
 Age    28.38 
       
 Prior Convictions    0.42 
    Case Characteristics     
 Class of Charge Filed     
  Felony 1  339 12.5  
  Felony 2  466 17.2  
  Felony 3  1003 37.0  
  Unclassified Felony  905 33.4  
      
 Type of Offense     
  Person  558 22.1  
  Property  822 32.5  
  Drug  860 34.0  
  Other  289 11.4  
       
 Completed Crime 1=yes 2,683 98.9  
   0=no 29 1.1  
      
 Number of Charges Filed    1.41 
       +Due to aggregation, independent variables were averaged across more than one offense. 
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Table 2  Codes and Frequencies of Dependent and Independent Variables:  Multinomial Dependent Variable 
Variable  code N % 
 
mean 
Dependent Variable     
 Case Disposition 1=negotiated plea 2,262 68.8%  
   2=non-negotiated plea 439 13.4  
   3=trial conviction 585 17.8  
      
Independent Variables+     
    Offender characteristics 
 
    
 Race/ethnicity     
  Black  2,169 68.2  
  Hispanic  517 16.3  
  White  460 14.5  
       
 Sex 1=male 2,915 89.6  
   0=female 340 10.4  
       
 Age    28.31 
       
 Prior Convictions    0.51 
    Case Characteristics     
 Class of Charge Filed     
  Felony 1  488 14.9  
  Felony 2  617 18.8  
  Felony 3  1,165 35.5  
  Unclassified Felony  1,017 30.9  
      
 Type of Offense     
  Person  784 25.6  
  Property  936 30.6  
  Drug  966 31.6  
  Other  371 12.1  
       
 Completed Crime 1=yes 3,244 98.7  
   0=no 45 1.3  
      
 Number of Charges Filed    1.42 
       +Due to aggregation, independent variables were averaged across more than one offense. 
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Table 3  Binomial logistic regression analysis of case disposition (negotiated plea or not) 
 b odds ratio | b(σx) | 
Severity of Charge Filed (“unclassified 
felony” is reference category)    
          Felony 1 -2.294* (1.152) 0.101 0.757 (1) 
          Felony 2 -1.922 (1.144) 0.146  
          Felony 3 -1.341 (1.136) 0.262  
Type of Offense (“other felony” is the 
reference category)    
          Person 0.332 (0.257) 1.394  
          Property 0.833* (0.219) 2.299 0.392 (3) 
          Drug -0.492 (1.141) 0.611  
Prior Convictions -0.376* (0.053) 0.686 0.410 (2) 
Number of Current Charges 0.007 (0.070) 0.915  
Offender Race/Ethnicity (“White” is 
reference category)    
          Black 0.153 (0.172) 1.165  
          Hispanic 0.194 (0.235) 1.214  
Sex -0.221 (0.189) 0.802  
Age 0.007 (0.007) 1.007  
Constant 2.538   
Number of cases 1768   
Nagelkerke R2 11.8   
-2 Log Likelihood (goodness of fit) 1595.929   
*p < .05    
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Table 4  Predicted Probabilities for Logistic Regression  
 Males Females 
 Person Property Drug Other Person Property Drug Other 
Black 0.636 0.743 0.434 0.578 0.686 0.783 0.489 0.631 
Hispanic 0.646 0.750 0.444 0.588 0.694 0.789 0.499 0.640 
White 0.600 0.712 0.397 0.541 0.652 0.755 0.451 0.595 
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Table 5  Multinomial logistic regression analysis of case disposition (negotiated plea; negotiated plea; trial 
conviction) 
 Negotiated Plea Non-Negotiated Plea 
 b 
odds 
ratio | b(σx) | b 
odds 
ratio | b(σx) | 
Severity of Charge Filed 
(“unclassified felony” is reference 
category) 
   
   
          Felony 1 -0.965 (1.114) 0.381  
1.028 
(1.353) 2.797  
          Felony 2 -0.607 (1.108) 0.545  
0.993 
(1.343) 2.700  
          Felony 3 0.181 (1.103) 1.198  
1.241 
(1.336) 3.458  
Type of Offense (“other felony” is 
the reference category)       
          Person 0.265 (0.235) 1.279  
-0.002 
(0.293) 0.977  
          Property 1.029* (0.203) 2.799 0.473 (2) 
0.188 
(0.257) 1.207  
          Drug 1.205 (1.110) 3.337  
1.407 
(1.346) 4.083  
Prior Convictions -0.456* (0.51) 0.634 0.543 (1) 
0.001 
(0.048) 0.998  
Number of Current Charges 0.001 (0.061) 1.006  
-0.022 
(0.074) 0.978  
Offender Race/Ethnicity (“White” is 
reference category)       
          Black -0.425* (0.178) 0.654 0.200 (4) 
-0.646* 
(0.214) 0.524 0.304 (1) 
          Hispanic -0.301 (0.231) 0.740  
-0.558 
(0.287) 0.573  
Sex 0.647* (0.220) 1.910 0.201 (3) 
0.890* 
(0.254) 2.436 0.276 (2) 
Age 0.001 (0.007) 1.006  
-0.002 
(0.008) 0.998  
Constant 0.353   -1.900   
Number of cases 2226      
Nagelkerke R2 0.176      
-2 Log Likelihood (goodness of fit) 2793.219      
*p < .05       
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Table 6  Predicted Probabilities for Multinomial Logistic Regression  
 Males Females 
 Negotiated 
Non- 
negotiated 
Jury/Bench  
Trial Negotiated 
Non- 
negotiated 
Jury/Bench  
Trial 
Person Offense       
Black 0.301 0.173 0.526 0.260 0.106 0.634 
Hispanic 0.308 0.179 0.513 0.272 0.111 0.617 
White 0.311 0.224 0.464 0.288 0.155 0.558 
Property Offense       
Black 0.350 0.178 0.472 0.333 0.111 0.556 
Hispanic 0.353 0.184 0.462 0.341 0.116 0.543 
White 0.346 0.228 0.426 0.345 0.160 0.496 
Drug Offense       
Black 0.316 0.275 0.409 0.305 0.218 0.477 
Hispanic 0.320 0.278 0.402 0.311 0.223 0.466 
White 0.318 0.302 0.379 0.312 0.262 0.426 
Other Offense       
Black 0.269 0.200 0.532 0.225 0.128 0.646 
Hispanic 0.277 0.205 0.517 0.237 0.134 0.629 
White 0.284 0.249 0.466 0.254 0.181 0.565 
 
